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THE INTERNATIONALIZED SECURITIES MARKET AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW - A REPLY TO JOHN M. FEDDERS
Michael SINGER *
The governor enquired what these boats were doing, and on being told they were surveying the
harbor [of Uraga, Japan], he said it was against the Japanese laws to allow of such examinations.
He was replied to that though the Japanese laws forbade such surveys, the American laws
command them, and that we were as much bound to obey the American as he was the Japanese
laws. Here was ... a most important point gained [1].
Mr. Fedders has in his various writings usefully focused attention upon the
undesirability of insider trading in securities markets. To an extent he may be
preaching to the converted. Few voices may be heard declaring the positive
social value of insider trading. Fedders does not, however, reflect a position of
international consensus when he goes on to assert, as he implicitly does, that
insider trading is so undesirable that the costs, economic and *social, of
suppressing it are worth bearing. It is possible that a world view to this effect is
indeed in the process of formation, although the international efforts of the
Division of Enforcement of the Securities and Exchange Commission under
Fedders may well be causing sufficient resentment to hamper rather than
encourage this process. But it is quite certain that no such world view presently
exists. Had Fedders confined himself to exhortation addressed to the commun-
ity of nations and designed to generate international cooperation in the
suppression of insider trading, I would have seen no reason to publish my
reactions. The Director of Enforcement of the SEC has, however, further
invoked the blessing of law in support of the unilateral measures that he favors
taking. In so doing, he has demonstrated a distressing failure to grasp the basic
rudiments of that international law whose support he so craves.
To see the nature of the problem, let us begin by reassessing Fedders'
"market fraud hypothetical" [2]. Suppose that ACo plans a tender offer for the
shares of BCo. Before the plan becomes public knowledge, X, who has heard of
it from private sources in ACo, places an order for the purchase of shares of
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BCo on a stock exchange within the United States through a bank in
Ruritania, a secrecy jurisdiction which does not forbid insider trading. X has
certainly performed an action in conflict with the nominal terms of Rules
10b-5 and 14e-3 promulgated under sections 10(b) and 14(e), respectively, of
the Securities Exchange Act [3], but to say that X has violated that Act
implicitly incorporates a determination that the jurisdiction of the United
States extends to permit the prescription of rules of law governing X's conduct.
Such a determination has been consistently made by the SEC and the courts of
the United States. The United States, however, lacks the power to create
international law by unilateral determination, and I strongly doubt whether
anything approaching a consensus of the international community in support
of the position of the United States could be found. This is particularly so in
the case that X is neither a citizen nor resident of the United States and places
the purchase order while in Ruritania, and ACo and BCo are not U.S.
corporations.
By way of analogy, suppose that Ruritania produces fine alcoholic bever-
ages, but is deeply concerned about alcoholism, especially among young
people. It therefore makes it a criminal offense for alcohol to be purchased by
or on behalf of any person under thirty years of age. Y, a citizen and resident
of the United States, asks her frieid B, also a citizen and resident of the
United States, who is taking a vacation in Ruritania to bring her back some
alcoholic beverages. B is thirty years of age, but Y is younger. May Ruritania,
consistently with international law, deem Y to have committed a criminal
offense at the moment when B, acting as her agent, purchases the alcohol?
Both the Ruritanian alcohol regulation and the U.S. insider trading regulation
forbid the purchase of certain commodities by certain persons of a certain
status; the status is one of age or of possession of non-public knowledge,
respectively. Both nations might reasonably be concerned that their markets in
the respective commodities be kept free of what they respectively regard as
taint or corruption. But taint and corruption mean different things to different
nations. In this example, each nation is untroubled by behavior that the other
actively suppresses. Each remains unmoved by the argument of the other that
the world would be a better place if it shared the other's concerns. The two
situations are quite closely parallel. Yet if Ruritania asserted jurisdiction over
Y, and imposed criminal sanctions, would the United States feel that Ruritania
was merely enforcing its regulation within its proper jurisdiction?
Note that the situation would be somewhat different if the transaction were
condemned by the laws of both countries. Thus, suppose that B purchased the
alcohol during the period when Prohibition was in force in the United States.
The act of purchase might then be viewed as in furtherance of an unlawful
conspiracy to import alcohol into the United States, and that country would
possibly applaud Ruritania's efforts to compel B to reveal Y's identity as
welcome assistance in the enforcement of U.S. regulations. As illustration, little
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international objection was heard to the U.S. antitrust attack on the Quinine
Cartel in the 1960s [4], whereas strenuous objection was raised to the attack on
the Uranium Cartel in the 1970s [5]. The United States asserted an extra-terri-
torial jurisdictional reach as long in the former case as in the latter. However,
in the former case it was perceived as acting as part of an international
consensus opposed to the activity in question, whereas in the latter it was
perceived as endeavoring to impose its contrary views on other nations within
their exclusive jurisdiction [6]. Thus, one might guess that officials of France,
which has a strong policy against insider trading, would be more receptive to
Fedders' proposal than those of Switzerland, which is less deeply concerned
with the matter [7].
Fedders expends a good deal of effort in persuading us that a party's
entering into a single commercial transaction within the United States con-
stitutes sufficient "minimum contacts" for the United States to exercise its
jurisdiction over that party [8]. In this he may well be correct, although for two
important reasons the cases he cites are inadequate to support his argument.
First, these cases all deal with situations in which the single commercial
transaction gave rise either to a continuing contractual relationship, from
which a dispute emerged, or to a continuing state of risk of harm, from which a
tort action resulted. He cites no case in which a single commercial transaction
without a subsequent relationship formed the basis for exercise of jurisdiction.
Secondly, it is hardly persuasive to rely wholly upon U.S. cases to establish
international law when the whole problem stems from differing views on the
part of the United States and other nations as to the content of that law. In
any event, the point may freely be conceded without undermining the most
severe criticisms of Fedders' position. His argument is merely one for the
existence of in personam jurisdiction. This is certainly present in the case of
banks that regularly place orders on U.S. stock exchanges. It may be present,
as I concede, in the case of the individual foreign purchaser, although the point
is less clear and there remains the further problem of service of process [9].
But, crucially, the fact that these parties may be haled before a court of the
United States in no way pre-empts the question whether international law
permits the application of U.S. law to their activities.
The United States has consistently taken a broad view of the extent to
which jurisdiction to prescribe attaches to, and travels with, a commodity
purchased in the United States. Thus, in the gas pipeline controversy of
1981-82, the United States purported to ban the sale to the USSR of
commodities purchased by Europeans from the United States. The ban ex-
tended to some goods which had already been sold to foreigners and left the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States. In the view of many, and possibly
all, other nations, the United States was attempting to exceed its lawful
jurisdiction. The general view is that while the United States may impose
contractual restrictions on the resale of such goods (and here too there may be
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problems if the public policy of the nation-in which the resale takes place
rejects the restrictions), it may not directly regulate their resale under its own
law. But our insider trading illustration is somewhat like this resale transaction.
The only party making a purchase in the United States is the bank. Any prior
and subsequent arrangements whereby it acts for X, the undisclosed principal,
are all made in Ruritania. Does U.S. jurisdiction attach to, and travel with, the
stock purchased there [10]? It is no argument at all to say that X is liable for
the actions of his agent, for presumably the agency law being applied is that of
the United States, and the jurisdictional question must first be answered before
it can be determined whether U.S. agency law properly governs X's behavior.
If it seems a quibble to focus on the territorial location where the agency
relationship was established, observe that from the point of view of Ruritania
it may seem equally a quibble to focus on the territorial location where the
stock purchase took place - especially if neither ACo nor BCo is a U.S.
corporation.
To a great extent Fedders conveys the impression of not according foreign
tolerance of insider trading full respect as a separate but equal legal construct.
This is a pity. I share Fedders' view that insider trading is undesirable, and
would be happy to see him so persuade other nations. Until such time as he
has done so, however, due regard" must be paid to the right of a nation to
protect conduct lawful within its borders and performed there, subject to the
limitations imposed by the effects doctrine as it is generally recognized in the
community of nations. Foreign laws are not to be dismissed as irritating
"impediments" to the universal application of the law of the United States.
The process of "internationalization of the securities markets" may itself be
perceived by other nations as good reason for U.S. law not to apply throughout
those markets. The notion of the SEC as world securities police may have less
than universal appeal, however "effective" it might be in ensuring "fair[ness]
and honest[y]" - as those terms are understood by the United States.
Foreign nations who perceive an encroachment upon their jurisdiction may,
as we have seen in recent years, react adversely. Not surprisingly, they may do
their best to obstruct the encroaching power. Indeed, it is remarkably to the
credit of the European nations that they have restrained themselves from
responding to the United States in kind. On the contrary, they have confined
their responses to the same jurisdictional limits within which they have sought
to confine the actions of the United States. Thus, the European response to
what it perceives as the unacceptable reach of U.S. antitrust jurisdiction has
not included criminal actions in domestic courts against U.S. corporations
combining under the protection of the Webb-Pomerene Act. In this they have
commendably eschewed short-term advantage in favor of the universal long-
term benefits of adherence to the international legal order, an approach from
which the United States could learn much. In the area of securities regulation,
foreign nations have generally confined themselves to non-cooperation in
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service of legal process and the enactment and enforcement of blocking laws.
An important observation needs to be made regarding the service of process
issuing from a U.S. court to a party outside the United States. Fedders cites
the Saint Gobain case [11] for the principle "that subpoenas cannot be served
outside the United States without approval by officials of the nation involved",
but, implicitly, that service of a summons or a complaint is less intrusive since
it merely "provide[s] a defendant with notice that a legal action has been
commenced" [12]. It cannot be too strongly stressed that, whatever hierarchy
of levels of intrusiveness one may desire to establish, neither procedure is
permissible without the consent, express or implied, of the foreign nation. It is
disingenuous to view service of process as merely informative in nature, since
service not only provides notice that an action has been commenced but also
has the legal effect of permitting it to proceed to a judicial hearing and
judgment. Furthermore, a summons demands a response, requiring an answer
on pain of suffering a default judgment [13]. It thus "seeks to compel specific
acts" just as does a subpoena. The acts compelled, and the sanction machinery
employed, may be different, but the principle remains unchanged. While many
nations do permit service of process by mail from abroad, if a nation decides,
for whatever reason, not to do so (and is not party to a treaty requiring it to do
so) it is violative of international law to proceed counter to its wishes [14].
Fedders' main attack is reserved for blocking statutes designed to enforce
secrecy laws. It is important to observe what the foreign nation is blocking and
what it is not. In our hypothetical example, if information as to X's identity is
physically within the United States then that nation does not lack power to
compel its production. The difficulty arises only when the SEC wishes to
examine documents physically located within Ruritania, and Ruritanian law
insists that those documents not be revealed. Once again, the United States
stands virtually alone in refusing to acknowledge that the law of the country
where documents are situated governs their disposition. This principle, evi-
denced by the widespread reaction in the form of blocking statutes to U.S.
attempts to discover foreign documents [15], is much older and broader than
the present controversy [16]. The principle is of general application to property
within the territorial jurisdiction of a state, as indubitably would have been
demonstrated had the extraterritorial application of U.S. regulations freezing
Iranian assets proceeded to litigation in European courts.
Parallel illustrations, in which the United States would vehemently support
the principle here enunciated, may readily be offered. Suppose that D at-
tempted to defraud a Ruritanian bank, and a prosecution in Ruritania results.
D sent letters from San Francisco as part of her scheme, and subsequently
consulted a California attorney to determine whether she was in danger of
being prosecuted in the United States. The Ruritanian authorities now demand
discovery of the attorney's record of the interview with D. Would the record be
released over D's protestation that California's attorney-client privilege pro-
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tects her secrecy interest in it? A nation whose various jurisdictions grant the
privilege of secrecy in varying degrees to communications with spouses,
physicians, psychotherapists, priests, social workers and even accountants
cannot reasonably balk at respecting another nation's privilege in favor of
communications with bankers.
Fedders, however, claims that nations are unlawfully giving their secrecy
laws "extraterritorial effect to cloak transactions that occur in the United
States" [17]. It is hard to suppress a wry smile at the notion of an official of the
U.S. Government complaining about the extraterritorial application of the
laws of other nations. On a substantive plane, a threefold response may be
made. First, our illustration in the context of the attorney-client privilege
demonstrates clearly enough that the United States would engage in similar
conduct in like circumstances. Secondly, in our example of insider trading, is
Ruritania not entitled under the U.S. view of the effects doctrine to apply its law
universally in order to protect itself against the likely and intended adverse
effect upon its domestic policy of protecting secrecy in communication?
Thirdly, Ruritania is prescribing law only with regard to conduct within its
territory. To dub this extraterritorial is to indulge in Orwellian Newspeak, and
hardly merits a serious response. Is Fedders defining as extraterritorial any
foreign law that does not maximize the capacity of the United States to enforce
its laws up to, and even beyond, the limits of its extraterritorial jurisdiction?
The "waiver by conduct" argument, upon which Fedders places so much
reliance [18], may also be dismissed in a few words. Any unilateral declaration
by the United States that "the act of trading securities in the United States
constitutes a waiver of any otherwise applicable secrecy or blocking laws that a
financial institution, a customer or an agent might claim" [19] is, like any other
law of the United States, effective only within the limits of the jurisdiction of
the United States to prescribe rules of law. A new law of waiver can reach no
further than could the substantive rules on insider trading. The United States
cannot enlarge its jurisdiction under international law by unilateral declara-
tion. Of course the United States might persuade other nations to adopt the
"waiver by conduct" rationale [20], but doing this will depend upon first
persuading them to share U.S. views on insider trading itself. They are hardly
likely to embrace the legal doctrine of waiver without paying heed to the
consequences of so doing. In short, the "waiver by conduct" argument is
devoid of substantive legal or policy content.
My analysis so far has been based upon the assumptions of the insider
trading hypothetical, in which Ruritania both tolerated insider trading and
refused to acknowledge that X had violated U.S. law by trading through a
Ruritanian bank. It is of crucial importance to the smooth running of the
international system to understand that these assumptions are inessential. We
may considerably weaken both of them without in any way changing our
conclusions as to what the United States may reasonably expect of Ruritania
in cooperating in the prosecution of X.
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Again, an illustration will be helpful. Suppose that in a cinema in the state
of Xanadu, patrons become aware of the presence of tobacco smoke. Smoking
in a public place is a felony in Xanadu, carryihg a maximum penalty of a fine
of $10,000 and/or two years imprisonment. The culprit, aware of discovery,
absconds and avoids arrest by driving off into the neighboring state of
Ruritania. Ruritania also bans smoking in public places, which it treats as a
misdemeanor carrying a maximum fine of $1,000. The Xanadu authorities
promptly telephone the Ruritanian authorities, urging them to set up road-
blocks in an attempt to find the felon, as would be the procedure in Xanadu.
The Ruritanians demur.
First [they say] while we regard smoking as harmful, and officially proscribe it, unlike you we do
not consider it worth extravagant efforts to root it out entirely. Our policy is to expend limited
resources in keeping the level down. Secondly, we have a strong policy against mass searches
[presumably Fedders would deprecate this extraterritorial application of Ruritanian policy], and
even if public smoking were a felony here we would not countenance the procedures you employ.
Thirdly, you are in effect trying to get us to pay the cost of implementing your policy with regard
to a crime committed in your territory. This cost should be borne by you. Thus we might be willing
to discuss setting up roadblocks in such cases if you are willing to discuss making payments at an
agreed level to any of our citizens who are stopped and who are innocent, to compensate them for
the intrusion.
The parallels are obvious. Why should Ruritania allow the SEC to delve
into the private financial affairs of great numbers of its citizens in order to
identify the few who may have committed an offense under U.S. law? Why
should these citizens have to bear the costs of conforming with the peculiarly
onerous discovery requirements of the United States? Why should the United
States not itself pay the entire cost of enforcing its own law? Note well that the
United States could readily deal with the problem of insider trading from
abroad, by requiring U.S. brokers to obtain advance assurances from foreign
purchasers that they would name any beneficial owner on demand from the
SEC. This requirement was contained in an amendment, proposed in 1976 but
never adopted, to Rule 17a-3(a)(9) [21]. If it is feared that such assurances
would be empty, there could be a requirement that the names of beneficial
owners be transmitted (with a statutory guarantee of secrecy) at the time of the
purchase order. But this would impose costs on U.S. brokers, and might lead
foreign investors to trade on non-U.S. exchanges [22] unless the United States
offered adequate compensation for the burdens imposed. Doubtless the United
States would prefer not to bear such costs. They are, however, the costs of
enforcement of its own policies, and other nations are unlikely to welcome any
attempted externalization of those costs. It is no answer to say that other
nations ought to shoulder some of the costs since they partake of the benefits.
Nations that do not share the United States' strong views on insider trading
would be paying a cost higher than the value to them of what they receive.
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It is vitally important to maintain a clear distinction between the benign end
of preventing, or at least limiting, insider trading, and the means appropriate
to achieving that end. The recent agreements negotiated with the Swiss
Government [23] and the Swiss Bankers' Association [24] epitomize the ap-
propriate means. If those agreements do not grant the SEC all it wants [25],
presumably they grant all that Switzerland is presently prepared to yield. It is a
cost of living in an international community adhering to the rule of law that
even powerful nations may occasionally fail to fulfill all their desires. It is
unacceptable for Fedders to dismiss as "unrealistic.., that the SEC can
negotiate separate disclosure agreements with each nation that has secrecy or
blocking statutes" [26]. Is the SEC rather to ride roughshod over the sovereign-
ties of fifteen or more nation-states [27]? We prefer to conclude, with Fedders,
that "while the way to cooperation may be difficult, the advantages far
outweigh the difficulties" [28].
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